ABSTRACT Research on product distribution channels has mainly focused on channel cost, risk aversion, consumer fairness preference, price decision, channel coordination, and channel selection while paying less attention to the product experience. Compared with offline channels, the online channel is at a disadvantage with regards to the product experience. For experience products, consumers cannot accurately access the value of the products through online channels because of its virtuality. In contrast, offline channels can attract more consumers with real product experience. However, the application of virtual reality technology has become increasingly more extensive in recent years. Virtual reality technology enhances the interaction level between online consumers and experience products, and it can help consumers assess product value more accurately, which has a greater impact on consumers' purchase decisions. Manufacturers can make full use of virtual reality technology to expand online sales. To maximize the manufacturers' revenue, this paper uses consumer utility theory and game theory to design four experience products' distribution channel models and analyzes the relationship between the manufacturers' revenue in different distribution channel models and virtual reality technology. The results show when the interaction level of virtual reality technology is low, manufacturers tend to choose a dual distribution channel, but when the interaction level of virtual reality technology is high, a single online distribution channel is the best choice for manufacturers.
I. INTRODUCTION
During the period since electronic commerce was introduced, many manufacturers, such as Clarks, Lenovo, Panasonic, Mattel, P&G, and H2O, have pioneered an online channel strategy using e-commerce platforms or their own online platforms. Manufacturers have found that the online channel strategy has benefited them by increasing their profits [1] - [3] . At the same time, an online channel can help consumers to find diverse products and learn about more products' information in a short time. However, subsequent manufacturers have realized that these benefits came with a disadvantage.
When the manufacturers open an online channel to sell products to consumers, the online channel only describes products with words, pictures, and video, which make consumers not able to accurately assess the value of the product. However, the offline channel can make consumers determine
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Nikhil Padhi. the real value of products through real product experience. Nelson divided products into search products and experience products [4] , [5] . For search products, such as books and audio-visual products, consumers already know the product characteristics before making their purchase decision. As a result, more consumers will switch to the online channel to buy products because of the lower price. Experience products are a type of product that consumers need to assess the value through a series of sensory methods such as smell, hearing, vision and touch. For experience products, such as jewelry and clothes, consumers need to study and experience them carefully before making their purchase decision. The online channel makes consumers unable to accurately assess the value of experience products due to virtuality. As a result, the offline channel is the first choice for consumers for buying experience products.
To expand the market share of online channels, some e-commence giants, such as eBay and Alibaba, have launched VR (Virtual Reality) platforms to attract online consumers of experience products. VR technology increases the realism of the choice environment compared to online shop setups using textual or pictorial stimuli; participants feel as though they are in the store rather than in the online shop. Human-Computer interaction is the core of VR technology. Such a feeling of presence has often been linked to virtual reality experiences and is an important advantage of using virtual reality. This feeling of presence could affect consumer behavior. After Alibaba launched VR technology for online sales in 2016, more than eight million active consumers were attracted. The sales volume of experience products such as clothes was increased by 1.5 times. Take apartment decoration as an example: companies use VR technology to enhance customer experience, and as a result, increasingly more consumers choose online channels for purchasing. At the same time, VR technology helps companies improve design and sign-up efficiency and reduce design costs. With the help of VR technology, the size of the online apartment decoration market reached nearly 300 billion yuan in 2017.
VR technology not only helps the online channel attract potential consumers but also makes offline consumers switch to the online channel. Based on this phenomenon, manufacturers with experience products must reselect and reanalyze distribution channels. Hence, we start from product experience and use consumer utility theory and game theory to design decision models of manufacturers with experience products. We analyze the relationship between the manufacturers' revenue in different distribution channels and VR technology.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains a summary of the pertinent literature. Section 3 describes the problem and analyzes the basic model. Section 4 analyzes distribution channel models. Numerical examples are provided in Section 5, and conclusions and areas for future research are presented in Section 6.
II. LITERATURE RESEARCH
The paper studies how to select the optimal distribution channel of experience products under VR technology. The research mainly involves the impact of VR technology on consumer shop experience and the related knowledge of distribution channel. Therefore, this section will organize and analyze the relevant research status from the following two parts.
A. THE IMPACT OF VR TECHNOLOGY ON CONSUMERS' EXPERIENCE
Consumers' adaptability to new technologies has increased; new technologies have largely affected consumer behavior. VR technology is paving the way to a robust transformation in the field of sales; it enhances consumers' overall experience and loyalty and improves the revenue of manufacturers and distributors [6] - [8] . Chiao et al. [9] noted that many business organizations were capable of surviving the ever-growing competition with the help of VR technology.
Pantano et al. [10] used VR technology to advertise for its new cupcake-flavored cookies through a mystical fantasyland filled with Milk Rivers and chocolate canyons. Lee et al. [11] collected 102 questionnaires and conducted an empirical analysis, and the results showed that VR technology could positively enhance students' shop experience compared to offline channels. Anne et al. [12] found VR pictures could help consumers understand the appearance of products more significantly compared to traditional pictures. Poushneh et al. [13] conducted an empirical analysis on consumers' experience, and the results showed that VR technology could increase the consumers' shop experience significantly and affect consumer behavior. Mark et al. [14] analyzed the sales of sunglasses and watches on traditional web sites and VR platforms, respectively. He found that VR platforms provided consumers with higher satisfaction. Van et al. [15] first noted that the higher the interaction level of human-computer was, the better the consumers shop experience. Furthermore, the study found that compared to texts and pictures, VR technology could better enhance the humancomputer interaction level and affect consumers' behavior.
B. DISTRIBUTION CHANNEL
Research on the dual channel supply chain is mainly concentrated on the price decision, channel coordination, and channel selection. Han et al. [16] thought the online channel decreased the offline retailers' revenue but increased consumers' surplus. Yao et al. [17] , Xu et al. [18] and Saha et al. [19] studied the impact of price on manufacturers' channel selection and price decision. As manufacturers sold products to consumers through a dual channel, Ding et al. [20] analyzed the manufacturers' price decisions under different channel structures. Chao et al. [21] and Xu et al. [22] used game theory to analyze the price competition between the online channel and offline channel and then noted that it is uncertain that the online channel decreases the offline retailers' revenue because of the decline in wholesale prices. Tian and Jiang [23] used game theory to design a costs sharing contract between manufactures and retailers, and studied the effects of the contracts on price and channel members' revenue. Nie et al. [24] proposed an analytical framework in which some consumers preferred an online channel and there are price comparison behaviors, and they analyzed the price decision and coordination strategies in the dual channel supply chain. Jerath et al. [25] proposed an analytical framework in which manufacturers expand online channels to compete with offline retailers, and they analyzed the value of service in the dual channel. Betancourt et al. [26] analyzed all of channel members' price decisions under the mixed structure of an offline channel and online channel, when the manufacturers establish an online-direct channel. Based on consumer behavior, Li et al. [27] analyzed the problem of a mixed channel. He came up with the optimal decision and channel efficiency under different channel structures. Dotto and Marchioli [28] considered the influence of the price sensitivity coefficient and competition coefficient on optimal price and coordination of different decision models in the dual channel, which is led by the manufacturers. Moorthy et al. [29] studied the retailer's optimal commission and retail sales effort in a supply chain system, which comprises an online retailer and a service provider.
To the best of our knowledge, research on the product distribution channel has mainly focused on channel cost, risk aversion, consumer fairness preference, price decision, channel coordination, and channel selection and has paid less attention to the product's own attributes. However, in common business situations, the attribute of product experience has a great impact on the choice of the product distribution channel.
Hence, our research makes two contributions: the first is to consider the product's own attributes, and we begin our research from the product experience; the second is to consider VR technology, because VR technology not only helps the online channel attract potential consumers but also makes offline consumers switch to the online channel.
III. DESCRIPTION OF THE PROBLEM AND ANALYSIS OF THE BASIC MODEL A. DESCRIPTION OF THE PROBLEM
In this section, we consider a manufacturer with experience products, an offline retailer and an online distributor. The manufacturer sells experience products through the offline distribution channel, the online-direct distribution channel and the online-indirect distribution channel. The consumer shopping experience is different due to different channels' characteristics. According to the assumption in [15] , the interaction level β(0 < β < 1) is used to measure the level of the online consumer shopping experience. The higher that β is, the stronger the shopping experience is. The single offline distribution channel is not considered in this paper, because VR technology only works on online channels. Due to the high cost of VR technology in its early stage, the manufacturer with experience products choosing only either the online-direct distribution channel or the online-indirect distribution channel. Thus, the manufacturer has four distribution channel modes to sell experience products, as shown in Figure 1 : the first is the online-direct distribution channel, represented by M1; the second is the online-indirect distribution channel, represented by M2; the third is the model of the dual distribution channels, which comprises the offline distribution channel and the online-direct distribution channel and is represented by M3; the forth is the model of the dual distribution channels, which comprises the offline distribution channel, and the online-indirect distribution channel and is represented by M4.
θ is the whole market demand of experience products; c m is the unit manufacturing cost of experience products; u j is consumers' utility; p j is the retail price of experience products; d j is the demand of the channels. j = o, d, i represents the offline distribution channel, online-direct distribution channel, and the online-indirect distribution channel, respectively. The manufacturer sells the experience products to the offline distributor at a wholesale price w o ; the manufacturer sells the experience products to the online distributor at a wholesale price w j ; π m , π d , π e represent the revenue of the manufacturer, offline distributor and online distributor, respectively. f 1 is the manufacturer's fixed cost when the manufacturer sells experience products through the offline distribution channel; f 2 is the manufacturer's fixed cost when the manufacturer sells experience products through the online-direct distribution channel; it is mainly the construction and operation of the VR web sites; f 3 is the manufacturer's fixed cost when the manufacturer sells experience products through the online-indirect distribution channel; it is mainly for the franchise fee of the VR platforms.
F is the offline distributor's fixed cost for selling products; it is mainly the cost of renting retail stores; G is the online distributor's fixed cost for selling products; it is mainly the operation cost for the VR websites.
B. DEMAND ANALYSIS OF CHANNELS BASED ON CONSUMERS' UTILITY
v is the consumer's consumption value (i.e., willingness to pay), and for analytic simplicity, we assume that it is uniformly distributed within the consumer population from 0 to 1, with a density of 1. If consumers purchase products through the offline distribution channel, consumers can obtain the full value of the experience products, because they have real contact with experience products; if consumers purchase products through the online distribution channels, the consumers may overestimate or underestimate the experience products' value due to the experience defects of the online distribution channel. Overestimating the experience products' value makes consumers dissatisfied with the products, which results in a series of costs incurred by reputation loss and returned products. Underestimating the experience products' value reduces the consumers' utility, which results in consumers refusing to buy products.
VR technology increases the realism of the choice environment and enhances consumers' overall experience. When the consumers buy experience products through the online channel, VR technology can help consumers accurately access the product value. The human-computer interaction level β is the core of the VR technology, and the higher the interaction level β is, the smaller the difference of the value evaluation between the online channel and offline channel (1 − β)v.
The demand of channels is described by consumers' utility. The consumers' utility of the online-direct channel is
, then consumers would like to buy products from the online-indirect channel. As a result, the channel demand functions can be written as:
M2 :
In model M3, consumers can buy from either channel; they would prefer the channel where they derive more utility. Thus, consumers will compare the consumers' utility through the online-direct channel with the consumers' utility derived through the offline channel, when they make purchasing decisions. The consumers' utility from the offline distribution channel is β) ), the consumer would be indifferent to buying from either the offline channel or the online-direct channel because the consumer derives equal utility from either channel. In model M4, consumers can buy from either channel, and they would prefer the channel where they derive more utility. Thus, consumers will compare the consumers' utility through the online-indirect channel with the consumers' utility derived through the offline channel, when they make purchasing decisions. β) ), the consumer would be indifferent to buying from either the offline channel or the online-indirect channel because the consumer derives equal utility from either channel. When 
M4 :
When β → 0, the gap between p o and p d & p i is growing larger. This means that when VR technology is not mature, the manufacture with experience products can maintain the demand of online channels through the different price decisions with the offline distributor. When β → 1, the gap between p o and p d & p i is becoming smaller. This means that when VR technology becomes mature, the online distributor can increase price to obtain more revenue.
IV. ANALYSIS OF DISTRIBUTION CHANNELS MODELS
VR technology enhances the online consumer shopping experience and improves the online service quality. At the same time, service costs increase. The service costs can be written as follows: c e = kβ 2 /2, k is the channel service costs factor.
A. MODEL OF SINGLE DISTRIBUTION CHANNEL
In M1, the manufacturer maximizes his revenue by setting the retail price p d . The manufacturer's decision is how to set the retail price p d to maximize the revenue. The revenue function for the manufacturer is given by
Based on the above revenue functions, we can come up with p d = (β + c m )/2, and the manufacturer's revenue in M1 is:
In M2, the manufacturer sells the experience products to the online distributor at a wholesale price w j , and then, the online distributor sells the experience products to the consumers at a retail price p i . We consider in this paper a type of Stackelberg competition model between the manufacturer and the online distributor. In this model, the online distributor, as the Stackelberg leader, chooses the wholesale and online prices first to maximize his revenue. The online distributor's question is how to set the retail price p i and the wholesale price w i to maximize the revenue. The revenue function for the manufacturer is given by
According to [30] , the wholesale price w i and the retail price p i satisfy w i = λc m + (1 − λ)p i , and λ(0 < λ < 1) represents the online distributor's dominance over the wholesale price. The VR technology increases the dominance. In addition, the higher the interaction level is, the higher the dominance. Thus, we can obtain the relationship between the interaction level and the wholesale price: w i = βc m + (1 − β)p i . Combining this relationship with formula (7), we can obtain the optimal retail price and wholesale price:
; the manufacturer's revenue in M2 is:
B. DUAL DISTRIBUTION CHANNEL MODELS
In M3, the manufacturer is the producer of experience products and plays the core role in the supply chain. We consider in this paper a type of Stackelberg competition model between the manufacturer and the offline distributor. In this model, the manufacturer, as the Stackelberg leader, chooses wholesale price w o and online retail price p d first to maximize his revenue, and then the offline distributor chooses retail price p o to maximize his revenue. To keep the offline distributor from buying through the online channel with a lower price, the wholesale price should not be higher than the online retail price. Thus, we have p d ≥ w o , which reflects a common business situation in practice. The revenue functions for the manufacturer and the offline distributor are given by
The second stage of the Stackelberg competition model is first determined according to inverse induction. The offline distributor's decision is how to set the offline retail price p o to maximize his revenue according to the manufacturer's strategy.
We obtain the optimal offline retail price p o with optimal conditions:
After that, the manufacturer's decision is how to set the online retail price p d and wholesale price w o to maximize the revenue.
We obtain the optimal retail price, wholesale price and the manufacture's revenue in M3:
In M4, we consider in this paper a type of Stackelberg competition between the manufacturer, the offline distributor and the online distributor. In the first stage of the Stackelberg competition model, the online distributor, as the Stackelberg leader, chooses wholesale price w o and online retail price p d first to maximize his revenue. In the second stage of the Stackelberg competition model, the manufacturer, as the Stackelberg leader, chooses wholesale price w o to maximize his revenue. In the third stage of the Stackelberg competition model, the offline distributor chooses retail price p o to maximize his revenue. The revenue function for the manufacturer and the offline distributor are given by
The third stage of the Stackelberg competition model is first determined by inverse induction. The offline distributor's decision is how to set the offline retail price p o to maximize his revenue according to the manufacturer's strategy.
We obtain the optimal retail price:
The second stage of the Stackelberg competition model is determined by inverse induction. The manufacturer's decision is how to set the wholesale price w o to maximize the revenue.
We obtain the optimal w o through formula (16) and formula (17):
Finally, the third stage of the Stackelberg competition model is to be determined. The online distributor's decision is how to set the online retail price p i to maximize his revenue.
We obtain the optimal online retail price p i through formula (16), formula (18) , and formula (19) .
We obtain the wholesale price w i , w o , and p o through formula (20) , formula (17) , and formula (15) , respectively, The manufacture's revenue in M4 is given by:
V. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
In this section, we perform numerical examples to illustrate the impact of VR technology on distribution channel selection. We fix the values of the parameters c m , θ, F, K , G, and they are shown in Table 1 . We obtain the revenue difference from formula (8) and formula (10) 
The relationship between the revenue difference π, the interaction level β of VR technology and the cost difference f 2 − f 3 in M1 and M2 is shown in Figure 2 . The management meaning of proposition 1 is as follows: At the beginning of the VR technology, although the revenue in the online-direct distribution channel is high, the sales volume in the online-indirect distribution channel is higher than the sales volume in the online-direct distribution channel, so the manufacturer should expand the market through online distributors. When the VR technology develops gradually and the online sales volume is high enough, the manufacturer should actively build their online-direct distribution channel to increase their revenue.
The relationship between the manufacturer's revenue in different models and the interaction level β is shown in Figure 3 and Figure 4 .
Proposition 2: Figure 3 shows that the manufacturer's revenue in M1 and M3 increase as the interaction level β increases. There is a critical point β 1 , when the interaction level β is lower, that is 0 < β < β 1 ; the manufacturer's revenue in M1 is lower than the manufacturer's revenue in M3; when the interaction level β is higher, that is, β 1 < β < 1, the manufacturer's revenue in M1 is higher than the manufacturer's revenue in M3. Figure 4 shows that the manufacturer's revenue in M2 and M4 increases as the interaction level β increases. There is a critical point β 2 , when the interaction level β is lower, that is, 0 < β < β 2 ; the manufacturer's revenue in M2 is lower than the manufacturer's revenue in M4; when the interaction level β is higher, that is, β 2 < β < 1, the manufacturer's revenue in M2 is higher than the manufacturer's revenue in M4.
The management meaning of proposition 2 is as follows: when the interaction level of VR technology is low, consumers cannot experience online products well; as a result, they prefer to buy experience products through the offline channel; thus, the manufacturer should choose the dual channel, which comprises the offline channel and online channel. When the interaction level of VR technology is high, consumers can experience online products very well, so as a result, they prefer to buy experience products through the online channel; thus, the manufacturer should choose a single online channel.
We obtain ∂w i /∂β > 0, ∂p d /∂β > 0, ∂p i /∂β > 0 from formula (11), formula (13) and formula (20) . Proposition 3: Both wholesale prices and retail prices in the dual distribution channel models or single distribution channel models increase as the interaction level β increases.
The management meaning of proposition 3 is as follows: VR technology increases the cost of the online distributor and the manufacturer. By balancing the cost that is caused by the use of VR technology, the online distributor improves the online retail price. The manufacturer increases the offline wholesale price to maximize his revenue. At the same time, it leads to a higher offline retail price.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH
This paper uses consumer utility theory and game theory to design four experience product distribution channel models and analyzes the relationship between the manufacturers' revenue in different distribution channel models and virtual reality technology. The research results show that VR technology has a great impact on the choice of experience product distribution channel models. When the interaction level of virtual reality technology is low, the manufacturers tend to choose a dual distribution channel, but when the interaction level of virtual reality technology is high, the single online distribution channel is the best choice for manufacturers.
The shortcoming of the paper is that we study only the manufacturer's strategy from the aspect of revenue. Therefore, in future research, we should discuss the manufacturer's strategy from multiple angles, such as customers' loyalty. In addition, a linear demand function is assumed in this paper. While this demand function has been used extensively in economics and marketing, we can continue to investigate whether the qualitative implications derived from our model can be generalized to other demand functions. JINGHUI YANG is currently a Professor with the College of Engineering, Shanghai Polytechnic University. Her research interests include information systems and engineering management.
LINING XING is currently a Professor with the Logistics and Transportation School, Central South University of Forestry and Technology. He has published more than 100 academic papers (more than 40 SCI searches), and these papers have been cited more than 800 times. Seven of them were selected in the first 1% and 10% of papers cited by ESI. His research interests include intelligent optimization and task scheduling. He was a recipient of the National Doctoral Thesis of the New Century Outstanding Talents of the Ministry of Education. He is a Reviewer for foreign journals such as the IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON EVOLUTIONARY COMPUTATION.
